Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
All Computer Science and Engineering
Research

Computer Science and Engineering

Report Number: WUCS-89-09
1989-02-23

Two Heuristic Functions for Decision
R. P. Loui
This paper investigates a different foundation for decision theory in which successive model
refinement is central. The idea is to modify utility so that it can sometimes be calculated for an
outcome without considering all the relevant properties that can be proved of the outcome, and
without considering the utilities of its children. We build partially ordered heuristic utility
functions. We treat the analysis of personal decision trees like heuristic search of game trees
(taking expectations instead of doing minimax). Analysis of decision then becomes a process
of constructing and evaluating defeasible arguments for decision. This leads to an... Read
complete abstract on page 2.

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cse_research

Recommended Citation
Loui, R. P., "Two Heuristic Functions for Decision" Report Number: WUCS-89-09 (1989). All Computer
Science and Engineering Research.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cse_research/722

Department of Computer Science & Engineering - Washington University in St. Louis
Campus Box 1045 - St. Louis, MO - 63130 - ph: (314) 935-6160.

This technical report is available at Washington University Open Scholarship: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/
cse_research/722

Two Heuristic Functions for Decision
R. P. Loui

Complete Abstract:
This paper investigates a different foundation for decision theory in which successive model refinement
is central. The idea is to modify utility so that it can sometimes be calculated for an outcome without
considering all the relevant properties that can be proved of the outcome, and without considering the
utilities of its children. We build partially ordered heuristic utility functions. We treat the analysis of
personal decision trees like heuristic search of game trees (taking expectations instead of doing
minimax). Analysis of decision then becomes a process of constructing and evaluating defeasible
arguments for decision. This leads to an iteratively improving computation of decision, or what Dean and
Boddy have dubbed an "anytime algorithm" for decision. An axiomatization of this idea is simple in an
existing system of defeasible reasoning. As a special case of defeasible reasoning, computing defeat
among decision trees is also simple. The axioms for preference that lead to metric utility can be retained
if we take the defeasibility to be a result of the epistemic problem of individuating objects of value. We
say nothing yet about the specification of actual search strategies for particular forms of heuristic utility
functions, though it is clearly a matter for further research.

